Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

Martin B. Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth. 2024. “Patient Versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16(3), 178–218.

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Abstract: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551,000 nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, due to limited cost-sharing, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their nursing home stays instead of transitioning to community-based care. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

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Media coverage: Bloomberg, Skilled Nursing News 1, Skilled Nursing News 2, UCLA Anderson Review